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The Demise of The Doctrine of Basic and
Fundamental Error in Pennsylvania and The New
Role of Strict Issue Preservation
I.

INTRODUCTION

In most jurisdictions, an assignment of error is essential for appellate review, and only those errors properly assigned will be considered by a higher court. With little exception, a proper assignment or specification as to error must be advanced by counsel,
including all grounds relied upon as a basis for appellate review.
This requirement can originate by statute or as a rule of court.' In
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, this burden, although not in
detail specifically placed upon the practicing attorney by statute,'
has been set forth by the courts.' This requirement places a great
deal of responsibility in the attorney's hands, for he must be ready
at every moment of trial and diligent in post-trial procedures if he
is to be certain that his client's rights are litigated to the fullest
and most beneficial extent. 4 Nonetheless, in the past, a lawyer who
was not absolutely diligent and overlooked a possibly key assignment of error did not automatically have the doors of appellate
review shut abruptly in his face; there was still the infrequently
invoked doctrine of basic and fundamental error to save him,
1. 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1218 (1958).
2. See generally PA. R. App. P. 2111 et. seq. The rules primarily set forth the requirements for the content of appellate briefs in terms of structure. See PA. R. App. P. 2111,
2113-19. There is, however, the requirement that when a reference to the trial record is
made, specific pages must be cited to the appellate court. See PA. R. App. P. 2132. See also
infra note 99 and accompanying text (the pertinent rule for assignment in the federal system) and infra notes 193-96 and accompanying text (a discussion of the Pennsylvania rules
regarding the contents of briefs).
See also PA. R. App. P. 302, which sets forth issue preservation requirements:
(a) General Rule. Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal.
(b) Charge to Jury. A general exception to the charge of the jury will not preserve an
issue for appeal. Special exception shall be taken to the language or omission complained of.
Id. See also infra note 199.
3. See infra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 84-93 and accompanying text for an earlier view. (Discussion of
Justice Roberts' opinion in Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255, 259 n.9, 322
A.2d 114, 117 n.9 (1974)).
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should the court in its far-reaching discretionary power bring it to
bear.5 Where an error occurred that was so harmful that it palpably led to an unjust verdict,6 the appellate court would not allow
the failure to raise specific errors prevent a reversal of the court
below.7 In 1974, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co.8 abrogated fully and finally the
long-lived basic and fundamental error doctrine.9 Dilliplaine's
progeny have reiterated the abandonment of the doctrine and have
expanded the rationale of the leading case." In consideration of
the stringent and difficult processes of education and training required of an individual before admission to the bar, Pennsylvania
courts are holding the practicing Commonwealth attorney to the
strictest standards of professional expertise and responsibility." A
Pennsylvania attorney in 1985 not only must raise proper exception during trial, but must maintain and preserve the assignment
of error throughout the entire post-trial period.
This comment examines the doctrine of basic and fundamental
error as it has long existed in the Commonwealth, both in regard to
its application and its seemingly simple, but often complex and
confusing nature. Having thus reviewed the doctrine, the impact of
Dilliplaine and its progeny will be discussed and analyzed, in the
hope of providing the reader with a full realization and appreciation of this impact. Finally, this comment will detail the effect that
this line of cases has had and will have on the practice of law in
the Commonwealth on a practical level.

II.

THE DOCTRINE OF BASIC AND FUNDAMENTAL ERROR

A.

As an Exception to the General Rule

It had long been established by case law in Pennsylvania that, as
a general rule, unassigned error at trial would not be considered on
5. See infra notes 13-76 and accompanying text (discussion of the doctrine of basic
and fundamental error).
6. See infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
7. See Herb v. Hallowell, 304 Pa. 128, 138, 154 A. 582, 585-86 (1931). See also infra
notes 61-76 and accompanying text.
8. 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114.
9. Id. at 260, 322 A.2d at 117. See infra notes 78-111 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Dilliplaine.
10. See infra notes 117-198 and accompanying text for a discussion of Dilliplaine's
progeny.
11. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
12. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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appeal."3 This had been the case whether the errors were in regard
to the form of the pleading, 4 the admission or failure to admit
certain elements of evidence,' s the particular instructions given or
refused to be given to the jury," as well as alleged error in the
verdict itself and refusal to grant post-trial motions for new trial or
judgment n.o.v.' 7 This rule, however, had never been absolute: a
13. See generally In re Noonday Club of Delaware County, Inc., 433 Pa. 458, 252 A.2d
568 (1968); Stitt v. Manufacturers Light and Heat Co., 432 Pa. 493, 248 A.2d 48 (1968);
Pennsylvania Co. for Insur. on Lives and Granting Annuities v. Conway, 353 Pa. 647, 46
A.2d 166 (1946); Provident Trust Co. v. Rothman, 321 Pa. 177, 183 A. 793 (1936); Borough
of Middletown v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 143 Pa. Super. 444, 17 A.2d 904
(1941); Quaker Worsted Mills Corp. v. Howard Trucking Corp., 131 Pa. Super. 1, 198 A. 691
(1938).
14. See, e.g., Banks v. McClain, 156 Pa. Super. 516, 40 A.2d 699 (1945). In Banks, the
appellant complained that the appellee's affidavit of defense did not set forth in detail
everything that the trustees therein demanded from appellant and should thus be dismissed. Id. at 518-19, 40 A.2d at 700. The court refused to consider appellant's charge of
error, stating:
Neither in the court below, in the assignment of error, nor in the statement of questions involved is any reference made to technical objections to the form of the affidavit of defense. We are not now concerned, therefore, with the alleged defects. In any
event the contention is without merit. We give it but passing comment.
Id. at 519, 40 A.2d at 700.
15. See, e.g., Boring v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 435 Pa. 513, 257 A.2d 565 (1969). In
his decision in Boring, Justice Eagen, in refusing to hear errors regarding the refusal to
exclude evidence on the highest and best use of land doctrine, noted that regardless of the
merit of his claim, the appellant did not take proper steps to preserve his right to have these
particular errors heard on appeal. Id. at 522, 257 A.2d at 570. Justice Eagen stated that
where specific grounds for exclusion are stated at trial, unasserted reasons are waived and
will not be heard on appeal. Id. (citing Beersk Estate, 429 Pa. 415, 241 A.2d 755 (1968);
Risbon v. Cotton, 387 Pa. 155, 127 A.2d 101 (1958); Lewis v. Pittsburgh Rys., 386 Pa. 490,
126 A.2d 454 (1956)). Further, Justice Eagen held that after testimony has been received
without objection, the refusal to strike is not reviewable. The court must be required to
instruct the jury to disregard the testimony and, upon refusal, to assign error. 435 Pa. at
522, 257 A.2d at 570. See Fuller v. Palazzolo, 329 Pa. 93, 197 A. 225 (1938). Also, the Boring
court pointed out, where only a part of a witness' testimony is objectionable, this portion
should be specifically pointed out, and it will not be error to refuse a motion to strike which
is general. 435 Pa. at 523, 257 A.2d at 570 (citing Gerhart v. East Coast Co., 310 Pa. 535, 166
A. 564 (1933)). Justices Cohen, Roberts, and Pomeroy concurred in the result. 435 Pa. at
525, 257 A.2d at 571.
16. See, e.g., Fuller v. Palazzolo, 329 Pa. 93, 197 A. 225 (1938). The court refused to
strike certain evidence adduced in cross-examination, where no objection was made to the
question at trial. Id. at 101, 197 A. at 229. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. The
Palazzolo court stated that the proper course would have been to ask the court to instruct
the jury to disregard the testimony and, upon refusal, to assign error. 329 Pa. at 101, 197 A.
at 229 (citing McDyer v. Eastern Pennsylvania Ry., 227 Pa. 641, 76 A. 841, 843 (1910), as
upheld in Boring).
17. See, e.g., George v. Richards, 361 Pa. 278, 64 A.2d 811 (1949), in which the court
held that a chancellor's finding of fact below, where not assigned as an error, is admitted
and cannot be challenged on appeal. Id. at 283, 64 A.2d at 813 (citing Smith's Estate, 308
Pa. 265, 162 A. 214 (1932)). See also Deitz v. Bridge, 155 Pa. Super. 655, 39 A.2d 287 (1944),
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number of cases allowed appellate courts a broad power of discretion. In some situations, the courts were able to overlook missing
or improper assignment of error and consider error that appeared
on the record where it would avoid unreasonably prolonged litigation or promote the interests of justice or the public welfare. 8 Appellate courts would consider and long had considered unassigned
error, at their discretion, where they saw plain or fundamental deficiencies on the face of the record.' To gain an understanding of
in which it was held that defendants were not entitled to a new trial where they argued that
a special verdict, as opposed to a general verdict, should have been requested. 155 Pa.
Super. at 659, 39 A.2d at 289. In the court's words:
A presumption that a verdict is responsive to the issues as raised by the pleadings
and the proofs, arises in support of a general verdict and some leniency must be
exercised in criticism of its form. Cf. Newport Coal Co. v. Ziegler, 255 Ky. 429, 74
S.W.2d 561 (1934). Here, defendants made no objection to the verdict before recording (Cf. East Broad Top Transit Co. v. Flood, 326 Pa. 353, 192 A. 401 (1937)) and no
assignment of error questions its form in this appeal. Foulk, et. al. v. Hampton, 299
Pa. 272, 149 A. 486 (1930).
155 Pa. Super. at 659, 39 A.2d at 289.
18. See, e.g., Taggert v. De Fellippo, 315 Pa. 438, 173 A. 423 (1934). In agreeing to
review unassigned error over an allegedly defective affidavit of defense of plaintiff in an
action in assumpsit, the court explained:
The power of the Superior Court to decide any issue pertinent to a case properly
before it, is specifically conferred by statute. Section 8 of the Act of June 24, 1895, P.
L. 212, provides that the Superior Court "may affirm, reverse, amend or modify any
order, judgment or decree as it may think to be just, or it may return the record for
further proceedings in the court below," and the authority to make such dispositions
of a case as seems proper to the court is not contingent upon the presence of assignment of error relating to questions decided on appeal. The Superior Court, in accordance with its rules, usually refuses to consider matters not formally raised by assignments of error, but its power to review any phase of a case before it cannot be
questioned, except where the action is contrary to statute.
Id. at 440-41, 173 A. at 424.
See supra note 14 for an opposite treatment of a similar factual situation.
19. See, e.g., Schmitt v. City of Philadelphia, 248 Pa. 124, 93 A. 879 (1915). In
Schmitt, pending an appeal from an award of viewer in condemnation proceedings, the ordinance appropriating the land in question and directing its condemnation was repealed, and
the court in a collateral proceeding determined what costs a landowner may recover and
directed by decree payment of such costs. Id. at 125-26, 93 A. at 879-80. The supreme court
saw this as so fatally erroneous to the city that it chose to correct this error even though it
was not made the subject of an assignment. Id. at 129, 93 A. at 880. As the court, per Justice
Stewart, explained:
This record discloses error, which, though not made the subject of exception or assignment, is too serious to be overlooked. "We do not indeed," observes Strung, J., in
Beans' Road, 35 Pa. 280, "often notice exceptions not taken in the court below, but
where there is radical error patent on the face of the record, especially when the court
has made a final order which cannot be executed, an order which in itself is erroneous, we will correct the mistake." This expresses the situation here as we will try to
show.
248 Pa. at 125, 93 A. at 879.
See also Carlton v. Sley System Garage, 143 Pa. Super. 127, 17 A.2d 748 (1940), where the
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what was encompassed by "basic and fundamental error," and exactly what a powerful, though infrequently used and unclearly defined weapon was abrogated by the Dilliplaine decision and its
progeny, an examination of a number of opinions in which the
court found such an error, and an examination of one case in which
it did not, will provide some illumination. 0
B. The Nature of the Doctrine: Immensely Powerful,
Inconsistently Applied
Rather than briefly address many opinions that found basic and
fundamental error in a number of factual situations, it will be more
useful to examine a limited number in careful detail in order to
attempt to expose which type of error formerly reached the status
of being basic and fundamental. 2 One example of the application
of the doctrine is found in Patterson v. PittsburghRys. 22 Patterson involved an individual who, while boarding the streetcar of the
defendant, was hurled to the ground as the motorman closed the
doors prematurely. 23 The jury below found for the plaintiff, who
had sued in tort, and the defendant appealed, charging as error
that there had been no jury charge with respect to the value of the
witness' testimony, the plaintiff's evidence being uncorroborated
24
and the defendant having had six witnesses testify on his behalf.
The jury charge itself included no reference to the unequal number
of witnesses, and worse, according to the supreme court, implied
that all the witnesses were interested.25 Justice Stern noted that
the charge made it appear as if the defendant's six witnesses were
affirmation of points for charge which permitted a bailor to recover for damages to an automobile without proof of negligence involved a matter so fundamental and basic that the
superior court could not overlook it on appeal, even though the afiirmance was not made the
subject of an assignment of error, particularly when the question of negligence was a close
one. 143 Pa. Super. at 130-31, 17 A.2d at 750.
20. See infra notes 21-76 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 22-76 and accompanying text.
22. 322 Pa. 125, 185 A. 283 (1936).
23. Id. at 126, 185 A. at 283.
24. Id. at 126-27, 185 A. at 284.
25. Id. at 127, 185 A. at 284. The instructions read to the jury, in pertinent part, were
as follows:
It is your duty to examine the testimony of the witnesses for the defendant company
and to determine whether their employment and the desire to appear right in the
eyes of their employer and to appear to have fully discharged their duties would
cause them to hold back or color their testimony and testify differently from what
they would have if they were not so interested.
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in its employ, when actually, five of the six were not connected
with the company at all. 26 According to the court, the failure to
give the jury clarification as to the "probabilities" of the case arising from the defendant's overwhelming majority in number and
disinterestedness of witnesses invited the apparently capricious
jury verdict, and thus the verdict was clearly inadequate and the
basis of error.27 The court pointed out that numerous cases had
held that reversible error could be committed by a judge who minimized in a charge the advantage that one party may have over another by reason of a marked numerical preponderance of favorable
witnesses or who failed to caution the jury that it must consider
carefully the relative numbers and disinterestedness of the witnesses in weighing the conflicting testimony.2 8 The Pattersoncourt
then did precisely what Dilliplainenow forbids. 29 Although the defendant took only a general exception to the charge at the trial
below, the supreme court reversed the lower court because the instructions did not explain to the jury the legally established means
of determining the involved question of fact, thus creating fundamental error.8 0 The Patterson court also maintained that even
without a general exception, the appellate court may of its own
volition, because of basic and fundamental error, reverse a lower
court's decision.8 1
One may wonder what exactly made the error in Patterson so
basically and fundamentally erroneous. Certainly, during the
course of the examination and cross-examination at trial, the numerical superiority and overall disinterestedness of the defendant's
witnesses must have been exposed to the jury. One may also wonder why, if the error was indeed so grievous, the attorney for the
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 127-28, 185 A. at 284. See, e.g., Weiss v. Pgh. Rys., 242 Pa. 506, 89 A. 586
(1914); Cohen v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 228 Pa. 243, 77 A. 500 (1910); Davies v.
Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 228 Pa. 176, 77 A. 450 (1910); Hodder v. Philadelphia
Rapid Transit Co., 217 Pa. 110, 66 A. 239 (1907); Clark v. Union Traction Co., 210 Pa. 636,
60 A. 302 (1905).
29. 322 Pa. at 128, 185 A. at 284. See infra notes 84-93 and accompanying text.
30. Id. In the words of the court, "Inadequacy of a charge may be taken advantage of
on general exception where the instructions omitted are vital to a proper conception by the
juror of the fundamental principles of law involved." Id. See infra notes 33-48 and accompanying text (discussion of DiPietro v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 315 Pa. 209, 173 A.
165 (1934)). The Patterson court went on further to say that " the inadequacy is just as
basic where, in a case like the present, the legally established methods of determining the
factual questions involved are not explained to the jury." 322 Pa. at 128, 185 A. at 284.
31. 322 Pa. at 128, 185 A. at 284. See Marlowe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 313 Pa. 430, 169
A. 100 (1933); Schmitt v. City of Philadelphia, 248 Pa. 124, 93 A. 879 (1915).
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defendant below failed to raise this point as a possible basis for a
new trial. These seem to be valid questions. Nonetheless, in Patterson the defendant was held to be entitled, regardless of the general character of the trial, to have the jury at the conclusion of the
presentation of the evidence receive a separate charge that encompassed the comparable weights of all the elements of the evidence.
It is unclear, however, that every defendant, as a matter of law, is
so entitled. A major problem with the doctrine of basic and fundamental error thus surfaces at this point: its possibly inconsistent
application by the courts.32 The standard which the Patterson
court employed to declare the involved error basic and fundamental is markedly unclear, and there is no assurance that, when called
upon again to ascertain the impact of an alleged error, the court
would have applied the same standard. Patterson, then, holds no
more than that the jury charge in question was serious enough to
constitute basic and fundamental error.
The court in Patterson made reference to DiPietrov. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co."3 A careful examination of that decision, however, will afford little help in collecting and examining the
scattered clues to the nature of basic and fundamental error. In
DiPietro,the plaintiff was a guest in a car which collided with defendant's while the latter defendant was operating his vehicle for
business purposes.34 The plaintiff received a favorable verdict of
$85,000, which was reduced by the court to $60,000. s1 Defendant
appealed, assigning as error the evidence admitted and the instructions to the jury regarding the use of life expectancy tables in determining the duration and extent of the detriment to the plaintiff,
the evidence being admitted without objection."' The DiPietro
court noted that the standards for use of actuary tables as evidence were clearly set forth in McCaffrey v. Schwartz37 and its
32. See infra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
33. 315 Pa. at 209, 173 A. at 165. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
34. 315 Pa. at 211, 173 A. at 166.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 211-12, 173 A. at 166. The data from two divergent life expectancy tables
were available. First, the supreme court noted that data from the American Experience Tables of Mortality, utilized by the court in its instructions to the jury, was admitted into
evidence without objection, those tables showing a life expectancy for plaintiff of an additional 31.07 years. Id. See 41 C.J. Mortality Tables § 269 (1926). Also in evidence, though
not utilized by the lower court in its instructions, were the London Tables, which showed a
life expectancy for plaintiff of only an additional 21.1 years. 315 Pa. at 212, 173 A. at 166.
See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
37. 285 Pa. 561, 132 A. 810 (1926).
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progeny."8 McCaffrey held that all factors affecting the life expectancy of the individual had to be called to the jury's attention by
the court.39 The DiPietro court concluded that the pertinent part
of the charge below did not satisfy the McCaffrey requirements
because, in part, the charge made reference to data from one actuary table in evidence and not from the other.4 0
A later part of the charge, given to the jury for the purpose of
calculating specifically how much institutional care would cost
plaintiff for the rest of his life, made no reference at all to the
method that was to be used to calculate plaintiff's life expectancy,
although an estimate thereof was necessary in order to arrive at a
38. See Murray v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 359 Pa. 69, 58 A.2d 323 (1948); Schumacher v. Reading Transp. Co., 319 Pa. 254, 178 A. 670 (1935); Dravo Contracting Co. v.
James Rees and Sons Co., 291 Pa. 387, 140 A. 148 (1927); Davis v. Cauffiel, 287 Pa. 420, 135
A. 107 (1926).
39. 315 Pa. at 212-13, 173 A. at 167. The court noted that the standard from McCaffrey, 285 Pa. at 573-74, 132 A. at 814, and its progeny was that:
All the circumstances affecting the probable duration of plaintiff's life as disclosed by
the evidence. . . should be called to the attention of the jury....
The charge must
include a survey of such matters as sex, prior state of health, nature of daily employment and its peril, if any, manner of living, personal habits, individual characteristics
and other facts concerning the injured party, which may affect the duration of his
life.
315 Pa. at 212-13, 173 A. at 167. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. The DiPietro court stated that "we will hold trial judges to a strict compliance with their duty, as
therein expressed, in respect of the extent to which the tables can be utilized, and the limitations upon their use." 315 Pa. at 212, 173 A. at 166.
40. 315 Pa. at 213, 173 A. at 167. The trial judge charged the jury:
Under the practice of the courts in this state, certain mortality tables have been offered in evidence and are properly received and you may give them due weight after
you have had instructions. They are the result of experience and study and observation of certain insurance companies to determine the expectancy of life and you understand, assuming that Morando's age is 36, his health good, you may consider and
receive some aid from these tables which give his expectancy, the time which he
might be expected to live, as some "thirty" years. But you must not rely to a great
extent upon these tables, use them only as an aid. As you know, there can be no rule
by which we can measure the future of a life, so you will consider what Morando's
condition was at the time of the accident, what was his health . . . the nature of his
employment, and all of the attending circumstances given you, and the true conditions at that time and then what aid you may receive from these tables, you use in
determining what you believe to be his reasonable expectancy of life.
Id. (emphasis by the court). According to the supreme court, there was nothing said concerning plaintiff's manner of living, habits, individual characteristics, and other facts such as
heredity or environment, as may affect his life expectancy. The court believed this was because of the lack of evidence available on these subjects. The court reasoned, however, that
if the evidence was so meager as not to enable the judge to instruct the jury thereon, it was
too meager also to justify the use of the tables at all, and the jury should have been told
this. Id. at 214, 173 A. at 167.
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figure that would represent the extent of plaintiff's damages.41 Further, the court noted that the instructions were totally inadequate
since they omitted statements with respect to whether institutional
care for the plaintiff would be continuous, or if in relatively good
health the costs would lessen, or if his particular costs of care
would differ from those of another who was not in the identical
situation.4 2 The lack of specific exception to these omissions-only
a general exception having being made-did not prevent the court
from finding error and reversing, since the error was held to be a
basic and fundamental one. 41 "We have not overlooked the fact
that . . . no separate exception was taken at the trial," the court
stated, "but the error was a basic and fundamental one, within our
rule that for said errors we will always reverse where, as here, a
general exception was taken to the charge."' 44 The DiPietro court
concluded by stating that it was clear, as required by Herb v. Hallowell,45 that the error in the instant case "palpably led to an unjust verdict," and hence "the failure to ask for more specific in4
structions . . . will not prevent a reversal of the court below. "
The court saw no need to consider any other assigned errors,
whether valid or not,47 and it awarded a venire facias de novo. 4a
41. Id. at 215-16, 173 A. at 168. The DiPietro court maintained that the jury could
only understand the charge to mean that life expectancy should be ascertained from the
tables (The American Experience Tables), to which reference was made at some length earlier in the charge. Id. The charge on this point read:
Then you have future expenses along that line and there has been evidence offered as
to the cost of institutional care for this plaintiff, care and treatment, maintenance
and that cost has been given varying from $50 to $60 and $75 a week and on that
question you would again have to determine what in your judgment was the expectancy of life of the plaintiff.
Id. at 215, 173 A. at 168 (emphasis by the court).
42. Id. at 216, 173 A. at 168. According to the court, to recover at all the plaintiff
would have to not only prove his life expectancy after the injury, but would have to also
demonstrate the amount that would have to be paid for care with some measure of accuracy.
Also, this amount would have to be based upon his then present condition, not what was
generally paid by other patients in such institutions, unless their condition was substantially
the same as his. The jury was given no instructions whatsoever, the court continued, so far
as concerned the period of possible continuance of private institutional care. Id.
43. Id. at 217, 173 A. at 168-69.
44. Id. at 217, 173 A. at 168. The court overruled Ellsworth v. Lauth, 311 Pa. 286, 290,
166 A. 855, 856 (1933), to the extent that error with regard to the mortality tables was seen
in Ellsworth as not being basic and fundamental. 315 Pa. at 217, 173 A. at 169.
45. 304 Pa. 128, 154 A. 582 (1931).
46. 315 Pa. at 217, 173 A. at 169. See infra notes 61-76 and accompanying text for
discussion of Herb v. Hallowell.
47. 315 Pa. at 217, 173 A. at 169.
48. Id. A venire facias de novo is a new hearing that a court may grant a litigant when
there has been some impropriety or irregularity in returning the jury, where no judgment
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That the error "palpably led to an unjust verdict" offers little
help in seeking to grasp the nature of the expression "basic and
fundamental error." The meaning of the phrase clearly is within
the hands of the individual court. However, in looking at the Patterson and DiPietro decisions together, some consistency appears
to emerge. In both opinions, the court saw as basic and fundamental error the jury receiving an instruction or instructions that failed
to satisfy the dictates of prior case law. In each case, the instructions were held to be so insufficient as to lead the jury toward an
improper verdict. Though still largely at the discretion of the individual court, there seems to be something of a basis upon which
the classification of an error as basic and fundamental rests. What
is rather troubling, however, is that the errors in the two cases,
especially in Patterson, appear to be harmless, that is, having no
truly detrimental influence on the jury. In Patterson,as mentioned
above, the members of the jury had before them all the evidence
regarding the value of the witnesses' testimony; in DiPietro, the
instruction that all of the circumstances regarding life expectancy
should be considered, along with the numerous considerations explicitly pointed out by the court, would appear to be sufficient to
enable the jury to make a fair determination, even if only a moderately intelligent jury was assembled. Although some foundation for
a charge of basic and fundamental error is thus suggested in the
two preceding cases, the doctrine's inherent arbitrariness-and application in questionable circumstances-necessarily acts as a hindrance to consistency in the application of the doctrine.
A more recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in which
there was found basic and fundamental error is Millili v. Alan
Wood Steel Co., decided in 1965."9 In Millili, the plaintiff lost part
of his right hand in an industrial accident at the steel mill where
he was employed. 50 The defendant steel company received a
favorable verdict in the ensuing trespass action, but a new trial was
awarded on the ground that the judge failed to instruct the jury
that if the defendant's agent was guilty of reckless or wanton conduct, plaintiff could recover regardless of any contributory neglican be given upon a verdict because of its imperfection in some way, or where a judgment is
reversed on error. It is quite similar to new trial relief, in that a new trial does take place in
both proceedings. However, a venire facias de novo must be granted on matters which appear on the face of the record, whereas a new trial may be granted upon matters outside the

record.
49.
50.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1395 (5th Ed. 1979).

418 Pa. 154, 209 A.2d 817 (1965).
Id. at 156, 209 A.2d at 818.
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gence . 5s The defendant claimed that the awarding of a new trial
was improper because the plaintiff had not asked for any instruction, no specific or general exceptions to the charge were taken below, and the failure to instruct on this issue was not such a basic
and fundamental error as to warrant a new trial. 2 The supreme
court looked to Patterson v. Pittsburgh Rys., where a general exception had been held sufficient where an omission was seen as vital to the proper resolution of the fundamental principles of law
involved, and where even without a general exception, the court
would, of its own motion, reverse for basic and fundamental error.5s The court ruled that a new trial was proper,5 stating that in
a case in which the alleged negligence and contributory negligence
were so closely juxtaposed as to be almost intertwined, the trial
judge should have made clear to the jury the difference between
the two concepts, a clarification which had not been made. 55 In essence, the judge instructed the jury that if the plaintiff was negligent, it should find for the defendant, and the supreme court held
that this probably led the jury to the erroneous belief that the
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 156, 209 A.2d at 818. See Patterson v. Pgh. Rys., 322 Pa. 125, 128, 185 A.
283, 284 (1936) and discussion supra notes 22-31 and accompanying text.
54. 418 Pa. at 157, 209 A.2d at 819. See Sherwood v. Elgart, 383 Pa. 110, 117 A.2d 899
(1955), where the court held that it must sustain a correct decision if it can be sustained for
any reason whatsoever; it will not reverse a "right" decision if it is based on a wrong reason.
383 Pa. at 115, 117 A.2d at 901-02. The MiUili court ruled in favor of a new trial in spite of
the Sherwood holding. 418 Pa. at 157, 209 A.2d at 819.
55. 418 Pa. at 158-59, 209 A.2d at 819. The charge given to the jury on this matter, for
the sake of presenting an accurate account of what the jury actually heard, is set forth at
length:
It is required of a workman working in a place of danger that he exercise care for his
own safety according to the circumstances. He, the workman, knows that he is occupying a place of danger and his care must be commensurate with the danger. He
equally knows that he must perform faithfully the services required of him, both the
obligation to protect himself from harm in this place of danger and the obligation to
perform faithfully the services required of him must be met with a due regard for the
other duty. . . . Judged by this rule, was the plaintiff negligent?
Id. at 159-60, 209 A.2d at 820. In an earlier part of the charge, the court had provided the
following:
Just by this rule was the plaintiff negligent in grasping the rail upon which the crane
traveled, in determining whether the plaintiff was negligent your answer to the question of fact already called to your attention will be of some assistance. If you find that
the plaintiff was negligent, then it would be your duty to return a verdict for the
defendant. In such case you need give the instructions going to damages no further
consideration.
Id. at 158, 209 A.2d at 819.
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plaintiff had the burden of proving that he was without fault.5" In
reality, the defendant had the burden to show contributory negligence, and the trial court, the supreme court stated, failed to explain this to the jury: such omission was held to constitute basic
57
and fundamental error.
The plaintiff, the Millili court continued, was also entitled to
have the jury instructed with respect to reckless or wanton misconduct on the part of the defendant.5 8 Contributory negligence, the
court noted, would not be a bar to recovery if the defendant was
guilty of reckless or wanton misconduct.59 The Millili court noted
that the trial court should have made a more carefully considered
and more specific charge-it was not an abuse of discretion, therefore, for the court to reverse and grant a new trial.6 0
The error in Millili appears to be more deserving of the classification of basic and fundamental than those in Patterson and
DiPietro. In Millili, the instruction to the jury failed to clarify
which party had the burden of proof in the case-whether it was
56. Id. at 159-60, 209 A.2d at 819-20. The plaintiff had lost part of his right hand
when a crane being used at his worksite ran over and severed the appendage. The defendant
had asserted that the plaintiff had been contributorily negligent by having his hands placed
on the crane track rail. Id. at 160, 209 A.2d at 820. The court nevertheless maintained that,
because contributory negligence would be fatal to the plaintiff's case, such behavior "must
be established with that solemnity and quantum of proof required to establish any vital
fact." Id. at 162, 209 A.2d at 821.
In the instant case, the court noted, there was a notorious lack of evidence that the plaintiff had committed any negligent act, pointing out that there was no more fault attaching to
the plaintiff's act of placing his hand on the rail than there is in placing one's hand on a cold
stove. It is only when heat is introduced into a stove that it can burn, the court maintained,
and Millili's grasping of the crane track rail could not be contributory negligence in and of
itself. The court below erred, the Millili court held, in failing to charge that the burden of
proof was still on the defendant to establish that the plaintiff had contributed to his own
injury by taking hold of the crane rail. Id. at 160, 209 A.2d at 820.
57. Id. at 162, 209 A.2d at 821. According to the supreme court: "The case at bar
called loudly for instructions on the burden of proof regarding contributory negligence. The
court's charge contributed not even a whisper to this vital phase of the case. Such muteness
constituted basic and fundamental error." Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 162-63, 209 A.2d at 821-22. See Kasanovich v. George, 348 Pa. 199, 34 A.2d
523 (1943), where, reversing the trial court, the supreme court stated that instead of giving
binding instructions for the defendant, the judge should have instructed the jury that contributory negligence would be a bar even if defendant was grossly negligent, but it would not
be a bar if the defendant motorman was guilty of wanton misconduct or a reckless disregard
for the decedent's safety, when he saw the plaintiff's perilous position and failed, while traveling at a high rate of speed, to warn the plaintiff of his approach. 348 Pa. at 203, 34 A.2d at
525.
60. 418 Pa. at 163, 209 A.2d at 822. A concurring opinion was filed by Justice Cohen,
who stated that it was fundamental error not to charge the jury that defendant had the
burden of proving the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. Id. at 166, 209 A.2d at 823.
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the burden of the plaintiff to prove his own freedom from negligence, or the burden of the defendant to establish plaintiff's contribution to his own injury. An erroneous or unclear jury instruction on this matter clearly could lead to an improper verdict. What
makes the error qualitatively different from those in the previous
two cases examined is its possible impact on the trial results. Thus
if the standard applied was to be whether the jury instruction
"palpably led to an unjust verdict," the instruction in Millili appears to qualify. As already pointed out, the errors in the first two
cases seem to be much less offensive than that in Millili, though
the same standard purportedly was applied in all three to determine whether a new trial was warranted. The precedents which set
forth the importance of the clarification of the burden of proof
question are certainly readily available; all three cases are thus
consistent on this point, that is, that the instructions failed to satisfy precedential dictates. However, the startling difference among
the three cases in terms of the magnitude and impact of the errors'
divergence from case law requirement make apparent the dangerous inconsistency involved in applying the doctrine of basic and
fundamental error. In examining these three cases, the difficulty in
discerning precisely upon what criteria the courts were basing their
decision becomes apparent. Accordingly, the doctrine's application
by the appellate courts would appear to create a danger of chaos as
far as is concerned trial error and its effects upon judicial
processes.
The futility of attempting to gain an understanding of the notion of basic and fundamental error is brought even more fully to
bear in Herb v. Hallowell," in which an allegedly significant error
was held not to be basically and fundamentally erroneous.62 The
case involved tort litigation stemming from an automobile accident, the plaintiffs prevailing at trial and the defendant appealing
the outcome.6 3 One error asserted on appeal was that a particular
instruction with regard to the determination of compensation for
pain and suffering was misleading, in that it used the word
"worth" to describe the value rather than "compensation."" The
61. 304 Pa. 128, 154 A. 582 (1931).
62. Id. at 138-39, 154 A. at 586.
63. Id. at 132, 154 A. at 583.
64. Id. at 132-33, 154 A. at 584. The charge to the jury read as follows:
Then you will also take into consideration the pain and suffering of any of these three
plaintiffs, or all of them, endured by reason of the injuries, if there were any. There is
no fixed standard as to any amount to allow for pain and suffering. That is to be
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court noted that pain and suffering does differ between individuals, and how much one person might think reasonable compensation would differ from what another would find reasonable." The
court also noted that it was the duty of the trial judge to ensure
that the amount awarded was calculated by the jury as being limited to "compensation and compensation alone." 66 However, noting
the similarity in definition
among the words "compensation,"
' 67
"price," and "worth,

and the fact that jurors perceive intuitively

that there exists no fixed standard on pain and suffering, 68 the
court held that the instructions on pain and suffering were not
misleading and that if the defendant wanted more specific instructions, he should have made a request at the time of the trial.69
Another error assigned was that counsel for the plaintiff, in his
closing argument, asserted that the plaintiff's planned increase in
salary, because of his length of employment, would now be refused
because of his injuries, where there was no evidence of this introduced at the trial.70 Although the court noted that a mistatement
or unfair or prejudicial statements by counsel may be grounds for
guided by your good judgment. As I said before, consider the testimony in the case
carefully and see what you think the pain and suffering of Mr. Herb and his wife, and
the little boy, are worth.
Id. at 133, 154 A. at 584.
65. 304 Pa. at 133, 154 A. at 584.
66. Id. at 134, 154 A. at 584. See Collins v. Leafey, 124 Pa. 203, 214, 16 A. 765, 767
(1889), as authority for the court's remarks on this point.
67. 304 Pa. at 134-35, 154 A. at 584-85. Webster's New International Dictionary, noted
the court, defines "compensation" as, in part, "amends; an equivalent or recompense;"
"price" as, in part, that which one "accepts voluntarily in exchange for something else," or
as "a recompense;" and "worth" as, in part, "furnishing an equivalent for." Id. As the court
explained:
While the use of the word "price" or "worth" in instructions as to damages for pain
and suffering has been condemned and the use of the word "compensation" has been
approved (Baker et. al. v. Pennsylvania Co., 142 Pa. 503, [21 A. 979 (1891)]; Collins v.
Leafey, supra [124 Pa. 203, 16 A. 765 (1889)]; McLane v. Pgh. Rys., 230 Pa. 29 [79 A.
237 (1911)]), it is a matter of observation that few philologists get on juries. We believe that only a philologist would appreciate the difference between the word "compensation" and the word "price" or "worth" as used in instructions to be considered
by juries in assessing damages for the elements referred to.
304 Pa. at 134-35, 154 A. at 585.
68. 304 Pa. at 135, 154 A. at 585. According to the court, the jury was told that there
was no fixed standard, and people already perceived this intuitively: if "common sense
words in a common sense charge" succeed, the court stated, failure is often the result when
the court attempts to clarify to a jury the standard for measure by discriminating between
near synonymous words. Id.
69. Id. The court cited Snyder v. Reading Co., 284 Pa. 59, 130 A. 398 (1925), as authority for requiring request for more specific instructions. 304 Pa. at 136, 154 A. at 585.
70. 304 Pa. at 136, 154 A. at 585.
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exception, it was nevertheless a matter of discretion, and a judge's
decision could be reversed only in instances of abuse. 7 1 Because it
was held that there was no abuse, and because the jury members
still understood that they were to decide the case solely upon the
72
evidence presented at trial, there was held to be no error.
In addition, error was alleged with respect to the judge's failure
to instruct the jury to reduce any award that it might make as to
future loss of earnings to their present value. 75 No specific exceptions were taken to this instruction, but, rather, only a general exception to the charge.7 4 The Herb court held that, in light of the
small size of the verdict, there was no reversible error. 5 A charge
as error that the verdict was excessive was also summarily
dismissed. 6
The Herb court seemed to apply a "common sense" approach to
the basic and fundamental error issue, an approach that if applied
in Patterson and DiPietro would certainly have yielded opposite
results. The court in Herb looked at the alleged errors and determined, again by a standard that could seemingly only be based
upon the individual judges' predilections, that the asserted errors
had so minimal an impact on the jury verdict as to make them not
errors at all. A similar approach in Patterson would likely have
resulted in a finding that the instructions as to the weight and disinterestedness of the witnesses' testimony, in light of the evidence
given during the course of the trial itself, could have similarly had
71. Id. See Commonwealth v. Ezell, 212 Pa. 293, 61 A. 930, 931 (1905), where the
standard on this issue applied by the Herb court is set forth.
72. 304 Pa. at 137, 154 A. at 585.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 137, 154 A. at 585. The court cited McCaffrey v. Schwartz, 285 Pa. 561, 132
A. 810 (1926), where failure to charge on the reduction to present value was held not always
to be reversible error, especially where no request was made for this and no mention of the
lack thereof was made to the judge. According to the McCaffrey court, there may be such
circumstances where the default would amount to no more than an inadequacy. 285 Pa. at
567, 132 A. at 812. The Herb court stated that in this case, since the verdict amount was so
small ($5,520 for James Herb and $7,250 for his wife, 304 Pa. at 131, 154 A. at 583), there
was no reversible error. 304 Pa. at 137, 154 A. at 586. The court also noted particularly that
where no specific instructions were requested, no specific exceptions were made at trial, the
husband-plaintiff was less than forty-five years of age, and he had a relatively stable job as a
school teacher, the failure to instruct on accounting for loss of earnings toward the end of
husband-plaintiff's life was held not to be reversible error. 304 Pa. at 138, 154 A. at 586. See
discussion of McCaffrey v. Schwartz, supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
76. 304 Pa. at 138-39, 154 A. at 586. The court stated that the verdict was warranted
by the evidence: "We were fully expecting a larger verdict. The testimony in this case and
injuries of the plaintiff fully warranted it." Id. at 139, 154 A. at 586.
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so little an effect on the jury that it would be clear that no basic
and fundamental error had occurred. Similarly, in DiPietro,the instructions, which strayed very slightly from the dictates of precedent, would quite possibly not have been found to be basically and
fundamentally erroneous under the Herb approach, where the
court substantially offered to the jury a statement of the accepted
law involved. The approach adopted by the Millili court seems to
be somewhat along the lines of the Herb perspective. In Millili an
error that could obviously have resulted in an improper verdict was
seen as basic and fundamental error, whereas in Herb, what appears to have been of only slight impact on the verdict was found
to be harmless error. The inconsistency among the results of the
four cases seems patent. What also appears clear is that the decision whether to use a Millini/Herb"common sense" approach or a
Patterson/DiPietroapproach (whatever those latter two views may
be said to encompass) appears to rest solely on the tastes of the
presiding judges. That the inconsistent results are a product of the
varying approaches is also evident. The incongruity among the decisions in this respect ended, however, with a broad stroke of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's judicial brush in 1974 with the Dilliplaine decision.
III. Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Company: JUDICIAL
DISPOSAL OF THE DOCTRINE OF BASIC AND FUNDAMENTAL ERROR
Now that basic and fundamental error has been demonstrated as
the truly powerful (though limited and uncertain) weapon it has in
fact been in Pennsylvania jurisprudence, one will be able to better
appreciate what the court in Dilliplaine snatched from the attorney's arsenal. A careful examination of the Dilliplaineopinion will
not only reveal the rationale involved therein for disposing of the
doctrine of basic and fundamental error, but will also give a clue as
to what the progeny of this major decision has as its foundation."
In Dilliplaine, the plaintiff (Dilliplaine) lost in his tort action
against the estate of James A. Burdette. 7a The only issue raised by
the plaintiff after the trial was whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the deceased was presumed to have used
77. See infra notes 78-111 and accompanying text for discussion of Dilliplaine.See
also infra, notes 117-98 and accompanying text for discussion of its progeny.
78. 457 Pa. at 255, 322 A.2d at 115. Lehigh Valley Trust Company was the executor of
the Burdette estate. Id. at 256, 322 A.2d at 115.
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due care. 7 Dilliplaine freely admitted that he had neither offered
the point for charge nor took specific exception to the due care
instruction.8 0 In Dilliplaine'smotion for a new trial and again on
appeal to the superior court, the instruction was alleged to be basic
and fundamental error; however, this allegation was denied both
times.8 ' On appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the decision of the superior court was affirmed," the court offering a
careful analysis of the doctrine of basic and fundamental error.83
One of the problems with the doctrine, the court noted, which
made it an unworkable appellate procedure was that if recognized,
it would have a deleterious effect on the trial and appellate process. Another problem is that despite repeated articulation, it had
never been developed into a principled test but remained in essence merely a vehicle for reversal when the predilections of a majority of an appellate court were offended.8 4 Justice Roberts supported this contention by offering that by considering issues not
actually raised below, the trial merely became a dress rehearsal,
and any necessity for full trial preparation was removed.85 The
court noted that the doctrine also postponed the disposition of
other cases not yet tried for the first time, 86 eroded the finality of
79. Id. at 256, 322 A.2d at 115.
80. Id.
81. Id. The superior court affirmed the lower court's finding that since no points for
charge were offered on due care and no specific exceptions to the charge on this point were
taken, the subject was not to be considered on appeal. Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust
Co., 223 Pa. Super. 245, 297 A.2d 826 (1972).
82. 457 Pa. at 260, 322 A.2d at 117.
83. The court cited Millili and Patterson as examples of the doctrine. See supra notes
49-60, 22-31 and accompanying text.
84. 457 Pa. at 257, 322 A.2d at 116.
85. Id.
86. Id. See generally PA. R. Civ. P. 214, and, specifically PA. R. Civ. P. 214(d). Rule
214 provides:
Preference on trial lists.
Preference shall be given in preparation of trial lists to:
(a) Cases in which the Commonwealth is the real party in interest;
(b) Suits against defaulting officers of the Commonwealth or any political subdivision
thereof or the sureties of such officers;
(c) Actions of quo warranto or mandamus involving public officers;
(d) Cases in which a new trial has been granted, a judgment of nonsuit removed (excepting a nonsuit entered for failure of appearance) or a venire facias de novo
awarded, by either the court of original or appellate jurisdiction;
(e) Suits to recover wages due for manual labor;
(f) Cases arising under the laws of this Commonwealth to determine the competency
of any person alleged to be weak-minded, insane or a habitual drunkard;
(g) Such other cases as the court upon cause shown may designate.
PA. R. Civ. P. 214.
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decisions and encouraged unnecessary appeals, placing a great burden on the courts. 7 The court concluded that the doctrine really
did nothing but provide a hope for an appellate court to afford
relief from an adverse verdict. 8 This might have been an acceptable and justifiable procedure in the past, explained Justice Roberts, but now, with the alert professional representation at trial today, this could no longer be claimed.89 According to the court, the
high degree of education a lawyer receives today and the great responsibility he now possesses has made the doctrine unnecessary. 0
A second major weakness of the doctrine noted by Justice Roberts, was its ad hoc nature; the theory was continually re-formulated in terms of what a particular majority of an appellate court
considered basic or fundamental. 1 The court explained that the
doctrine was thus unworkable, neither the test itself nor the case
law applying it developing a predictable, neutrally-applied standard." The court concluded that basic and fundamental error had
no place in our modern system of jurisprudence, was an impediment to effective administration of the judicial system, and should
no longer be recognized for consideration on appeal of allegedly
erroneous jury instructions: specific exceptions must be taken for
an issue to be considered on appeal.as
Justice Manderino noted in his concurrence that the abolition of
87. 457 Pa. at 258, 322 A.2d at 116. See PA. R. Civ. P. 227(b) where it is stated:
Exceptions
(b) Unless specifically allowed by the court, all exceptions to the charge to the jury
shall be taken before the jury retires. On request of any party all such exceptions and
arguments thereon shall be made out of hearing of the jury.
PA. R. Civ. P. 227(b).
88. 457 Pa. at 258, 322 A.2d at 116.
89. Id.
90. Id. See also Spiegelberg, Forward to A. LEVIN & H. CRAMER, TRIAL ADVOCACY,
PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS

at xiii (1968). Spiegelberg writes, "A hundred years ago over

eighty-five per cent of the lawyers in this country became lawyers by reading law in an
office. Today the figure is less than ten per cent and in some of the more populous states
practically negligible." 457 Pa. at 258 n.5, 322 A.2d at 116 n.5. See also MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,

DR 6-101(A)(2) (1971), which provides: "(A) A lawyer shall

not:. . . (2) Handle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the circumstances." 457
Pa. at 259 n.9, 322 A.2d at 117 n.9.
91. 457 Pa. at 259 n.10, 322 A.2d at 117 n.10, citing as examples of the doctrine Leech
v. Jones, 421 Pa. 1, 218 A.2d 722 (1966); Millili v. Alan Wood Steel Co., 418 Pa. 154, 209
A.2d 817 (1965) (see supra notes 49-60 and accompanying text); Enfield v. Stout, 400 Pa. 6,
161 A.2d 22 (1960); Patterson v. Pgh. Rys., 322 Pa. 125, 185 A. 283 (1936) (see supra notes
22-31 and accompanying text.).
92. 457 Pa. at 259, 322 A.2d at 177.
93. Id. at 260, 322 A.2d at 117.
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the doctrine did not leave the aggrieved party without remedy. 94
Where an exception in a criminal trial was not properly raised, a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel could effect review. 95 In
the same way, where an attorney might fail to raise a proper exception in a civil proceeding, though there is no constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel, an action for malpractice could afford relief to the aggrieved party."
Justice Pomeroy offered a rather lengthy concurrence and dissent to the opinion of the court.9 7 Though feeling the result here a
correct one, Justice Pomeroy did not think that the doctrine of
basic and fundamental error should be discarded, as it served a
rare but useful role in protecting the rights of litigants.s The Justice noted that the doctrine had been long established in this and
other jurisdictions, including the federal courts. 99 Justice Pomeroy
reasoned that the doctrine should apply to all trial errors so unusual as to deny a litigant due process of law, rather than only to
errors in instructions, because of the fundamental right to a fair
and impartial trial guaranteed to all litigants by the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution. 100
Further, Justice Pomeroy maintained that the majority's fear of
a careless or cynical disregard for orderly trial procedure 10 ' was un94. Id. (Manderino, J., concurring).
95. Id. The standard for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Justice Manderino
noted, was set forth in Commonwealth ex. rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235
A.2d 349 (1967). 457 Pa. at 260, 322 A.2d at 117. (Manderino, J., concurring).
96. 457 Pa. at 260, 322 A.2d at 117-18. (Manderino, J., concurring).
97. Id. at 261-64, 322 A.2d at 118-19. (Pomeroy, J., concurring and dissenting).
98. Id. at 261, 322 A.2d at 118. (Pomeroy, J., concurring and dissenting).
99. Id. at 261 n.1, 322 A.2d 118 n.1. (Pomeroy, J., concurring and dissenting). Al-though in the federal system no party may assign error unless he states distinctly the
grounds and the matter objected to, Justice Pomeroy noted, the federal courts still recognized the doctrine of basic and fundamental error as an exception to the rule's requirements. Id. (Pomeroy, J., concurring and dissenting). See FED. R. Civ. P. 51, where it is
stated: "no party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless
he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter
to which he objects and the grounds of his objection." FEn. R. Civ. P. 51. See also King v.
Laborers Local 818, 433 F.2d 273 (6th Cir. 1971) and Anteiro v. Coca-Cola Bottling, Midwest, Inc., 47 F.R.D. 186, 188 (D. Minn. 1969) and cases cited therein as authority for the
acceptance of basic and fundamental error in the federal courts.
100. 457 Pa. at 261, 322 A.2d at 118. (Pomeroy, J., concurring and dissenting). According to Justice Pomeroy, the doctrine should be available "to remedy only those trial errors
so contrary to fundamental fairness as to reach the dimensions of a constitutional violation." Id. (Pomeroy, J., concurring and dissenting). See concurring opinions of Justice Pomeroy in Adoption of R.I., 455 Pa. 29, 34, 312 A.2d 601, 604 (1972); Commonwealth v. Thompson, 444 Pa. 312, 317, 281 A.2d 856, 858 (1971) (joined also by Justices Eagen and Barbieri).
101. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
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warranted, since an attorney would not risk being unprepared for
trial and possibly facing a malpractice or incompetence charge on
the slight chance that a court would find basic and fundamental
error and invoke the doctrine: an attorney, Justice Pomeroy
claimed, has everything to gain and nothing to lose in making
timely objections to error at trial.10 2 Also, Justice Pomeroy continued, not all other legal theorists had such a complacent attitude
toward an attorney's legal education today, 0 3 and perhaps this im04
portant protection for litigants should not be so freely discarded.
Noting that Chief Justice Burger had suggested that the quality of
the legal profession has been lowered, Justice Pomeroy claimed
that the court should not try to reverse this trend at the expense of
innocent litigants with unqualified attorneys. 0 5 This was especially
thought to be the case given the recent phenomenal changes in
substantive and procedural law, as well as the great increase in the
volume of litigation. Further, Justice Pomeroy asserted, allowing
courts to hear issues that have not all been properly raised or preserved below did not overburden the appellate dockets, since there
would always be frivolous appeals.' 0 This would be especially true
in the criminal system, the Justice pointed out, because there were
no costs for legal representation, the state procedure had to be exhausted completely before any defendant could have a chance at
federal relief, and errors not raised would almost certainly resurface in post-trial proceedings, especially in charges of ineffective
assistance of counsel. 0 7 Thus, Justice Pomeroy concluded that judicial economy would actually be furthered by dealing with errors
of this sort in direct appeal from the judgment of sentence.'0 8
102. 457 Pa. at 262, 322 A.2d at 118. (Pomeroy, J., concurring and dissenting).
103. Id. (Pomeroy, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Pomeroy offered as an example of this differing viewpoint the words of Chief Justice Warren E. Burger. In remarking
that some trial judges of general jurisdiction think that less than twenty-five percent of
lawyers practicing today are not really qualified, while others place the figure on incompetent attorneys as high as seventy-five percent, Chief Justice Burger stated: "It would be safe
to pick a middle ground and accept as a working hypothesis that from one-third to one-half
of the lawyers who appear in the serious cases are not really qualified to render fully adequate representation." Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training
and Certification of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 FORDHAM L. REv.
227, 234 (1973). 457 Pa. at 262-63, 322 A.2d at 118-19. (Pomeroy, J., concurring and
dissenting).
104. 457 Pa. at 263, 322 A.2d at 119. (Pomeroy, J., concurring and dissenting).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 263-64, 322 A.2d at 119 (Pomeroy, J., concurring and dissenting). See Commonwealth v. Hallowell, 441 Pa. 221, 226-27, 282 A.2d 327, 329 (1971), where the admissibil-
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Justice Pomeroy pointed out that the rule being discarded had
as its basis the protection of litigants, not the benefaction of lazy
or incompetent lawyers. 109 Any notions of judicial economy, the
dissent continued, must give way to the basic rights of litigants in
the rare situations where basic rights of this sort are in the balance.11 ' Justice Pomeroy concluded that the court in doing away
with the doctrine of basic and fundamental error in Pennsylvania,
had taken an unnecessary and unwise step."'
Notwithstanding Justice Pomeroy's strong dissent, the doctrine
of basic and fundamental error died in Dilliplaine along with Mr.
Dilliplaine's hope for a new trial. As such, the problems of inconsistency in application of the doctrine are resolved: if an error is
not timely raised and properly preserved at the trial and post-trial
stages of the litigation, it cannot be entertained on appeal. The
onus after Dilliplaineis clearly upon the attorney to be as close to
perfect as humanly possible in his representation of the client or
face the possibility of defending his own malpractice litigation. Unquestionably, Dilliplaine makes the attorney's job more difficult;
nevertheless, the positive effects of a more thoroughly prepared
army of lawyers must be considered a benefit of this landmark decision. Numerous other courts within the Commonwealth have
been presented Dilliplaine-like problems subsequent to Justice
Roberts' opinion, and their resolution of these problems, as will be
seen below, offers no lightening of the attorney's burden.
IV.

Dilliplaine's PROGENY AND THE BURDEN ON THE
PENNSYLVANIA LAWYER

The doctrine of basic and fundamental error, after the Dilliplaine decision, no longer exists as a valid legal theory in Pennsylvania. Relying on the Dilliplaine decision and rationale, numerous other court opinions have expanded and modified the burden
that Dilliplaine has placed on the practicing attorney. Now, as
mentioned above, not only must all errors be specifically excepted
to at trial," 2 even if they might reach the level of basic and fundaity of a confession would be an issue on appeal not only where specifically objected to but
also where it is at issue under the evidence, where recognizable evidence of involuntariness
would be sufficient to alert the trial court as to the existence of this issue.
109. 457 Pa. at 264, 322 A.2d at 119 (Pomeroy, J., concurring and dissenting).
110. Id. Cf. Neiderman v Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 412, 261 A.2d 84, 89 (1970).
111. 457 Pa. at 264, 322 A.2d at 119 (Pomeroy, J., concurring and dissenting).
112. See infra notes 117-52 and accompanying text.
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mental error,11 they must continue to be preserved in post-trial
motions for new trial and judgment n.o.v.," 4 and any briefs
presented in support thereof."' Otherwise, the issues raised by
these errors will be deemed waived as far as any right to be considered on appeal is concerned." 6
In Tagnani v. Lew, 117 the issue presented to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court was whether the court en banc may grant relief on
a motion after the verdict, where no such relief was requested at
trial."1 8 In a trespass action for damages arising from Elizabeth
Tagnani's death, a verdict in favor of the defendants was returned.11 9 Mrs. Tagnani's estate filed post-verdict motions, and the
court en banc granted a new trial. 120 The superior court, upon appeal by defendants, affirmed.'2 1 The basis for the granting of a new
trial was the defendant's attempt at trial to enter evidence on the
possibility of remarriage of decedent's husband; the question was
objected to and not answered upon the sustaining of the objection. "2' 2 No further relief was sought by appellees, such as a request
1 23
for cautionary instructions or a request for withdrawal of a juror.
On the post-verdict motions, the court en banc decided that a new
trial was warranted by the unanswered, highly prejudicial
24
question. 1
Upon the superior court's affirmance of the granting of a new
trial, the defendants appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
The superior court en banc, the supreme court noted, relied on
113. See supra notes 22-76 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the nature of
basic and fundamental error.
114. See infra notes 146-98 and accompanying text.
115. See infra notes 170-98 and accompanying text.
116. See supra discussion at notes 1-4, 13-17 and accompanying text.
117. 493 Pa. 371, 426 A.2d 595 (1981).
118. Id. at 372-73, 426 A.2d at 595.
119. Id. at 373, 426 A.2d at 595.
120. Tagnani v. Lew, 261 Pa. Super. 591, 396 A.2d 64 (1978).
121. 493 Pa. at 373, 426 A.2d at 595.
122. Id.
123. Id. Appellant did not challenge the impropriety of the question. Id. See Evans v.
Reading Co., 242 Pa. Super. 209, 217, 363 A.2d 1234, 1238 (1976), for the most recent appellate pronouncement of the law concerning testimony of the possibility of remarriage. According to the Evans court, the majority of American jurisdictions entertaining this issue
have concluded that evidence of remarriage is inadmissible in a wrongful death action. See
Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 252 (1963). Moreover, the Evans court noted, a number of federal
courts have interpreted Philpott v. Pennsylvania R.R., 175 Pa. 570, 34 A. 856 (1896), to
prohibit such evidence. 242 Pa. Super. at 217, 363 A.2d at 1238 (citations omitted).
124. 493 Pa. at 373, 426 A.2d at 595.
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Hill v. Gerheim,125 which granted broad discretion to trial courts in
granting new trials upon the basis of "justice and fairness.

' 126

That

broad discretion, Justice Nix maintained, had to now be measured
in light of the strict rule of issue preservation announced in Dilliplaine.127 The court noted the two practical problems with the
2
basic and fundamental error doctrine mentioned in Dilliplaine18
and concluded that whether the test is framed in terms of "justice
and fairness" or "basic and fundamental error," the resulting criteria were the same, and the objections in Dilliplaine were equally
valid.1 29 Justice Nix noted that there was no legitimate basis for
distinction between the situation where the claim is not timely
raised and the case where the remedy sought was not timely pursued, since the Dilliplaine concerns were equally applicable to
both. 3 ° The Tagnani court explained that if the trial court had
been alerted to the alleged "taint" (specifically, that the sustaining
of the objection was not sufficient to protect appellee's interests), it
could have remedied the situation if necessary; the appellant's failure to pursue this at trial would justify the trial court's conclusion
that no further action thereon was necessary. The court then characterized the failure as causing "an unnecessary waste of judicial
resources," because it resulted in the continuation and conclusion
of a proceeding which could have been promptly terminated. 3 '
The supreme court in Tagnani noted the necessity of strict compliance with the procedures designed for issue preservation in or125. 419 Pa. 349, 214 A.2d 240 (1965).
126. 493 Pa. at 374, 214 A.2d at 596. Under the Hill approach, the trial court had the
implicit authority on the basis of "justice and fairness" to disturb verdicts when they did
not comport with that court's response to the evidence. 419 Pa. at 353, 214 A.2d at 243.
Justice Nix distinguished Hill, however, because the complaint in Tagnani does not rise to
the level of offending justice and fairness. The offensive question in this case could only
have prejudiced plaintiff-appellee's case as to damages, since the verdict shows that the jury
decided against plaintiff-appellee on the liability question. The Tagnani court refused to
use this distinction, however, as the basis of its decision. 493 Pa. at 374 n.2, 426 A.2d at 596
n.2.
127. 493 Pa. at 374, 426 A.2d at 596. See supra notes 78-93 and accompanying text.
128. 493 Pa. at 374, 426 A.2d at 596.
129. Id. at 375, 426 A.2d at 597.
130. Id.
131. Id. In the words of the Tagnani court:
[T]he unnecessary waste of judicial resources resulting from the failure to afford the
trial court the opportunity to correct error during the trial and thereby avoid the
necessity of a retrial is graphically demonstrated in this case. Even if the error was of
such magnitude that it could not have been cured, the trial could have been immediately aborted, thereby preventing the additional waste of completing the infirm
proceeding.
Id. at 375-76, 426 A.2d at 597.
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der to maximize the efficiency and quality of the dispute resolution
process. Justice Nix maintained that a high degree of professionalism must be required in light of the volume and complexity of
matters before the courts. 132 The wide discretion afforded to the
trial courts in deciding whether to award a new trial still remained,13 s Justice Nix added, but only where the court is considering issues properly before it. 3 4 The court then noted the consistency of Dilliplaine's progeny' 3 5 and reversed the order for a new
trial as being in error. 13 6
The approach taken in Tagnani had been adopted earlier by the
superior court in Tronzo v. Flohr Chevrolet, Inc.13 7 and Williams
v. Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Co."3 8 In Tronzo, the plaintiff
sued a car dealer to recover a deposit of $250 and other incidental
damages incurred as the result of seller's failure to deliver a new
automobile as the written purchase order specified. 3 9 Plaintiff won
a verdict of $640 at trial and the defendant appealed to the superior court.' 4 0 On appeal, the seller raised numerous, possibly meritorious, arguments conhcerning the insufficiency of the plaintiff's
proof below,'1 but the superior court noted that none of the issues
132. Id. at 376, 426 A.2d at 597.
133. Id. See generally the Getz line of cases: Getz v. Balliet, 431 Pa. 441, 246 A.2d 108
(1968); Green v. Johnson, 424 Pa. 296, 227 A.2d 644 (1967); Burchard v. Seber, 417 Pa. 431,
207 A.2d 896 (1965); and Bellettier v. Philadelphia, 367 Pa. 638, 81 A.2d 857 (1951). 493 Pa.
at 376, 426 A.2d at 597.
134. 493 Pa. at 376, 426 A.2d at 597. Here, noted Justice Nix, the concern is not the
extent of the court's discretion but rather the matters that the court may properly consider.

Id.
135. Id. at 376-77, 426 A.2d at 597. See, e.g., City of Pittsburgh v. Pennsylvania Dep't
of Transp., 490 Pa. 264, 416 A.2d 461 (1980) (argument not appearing in pleadings is
waived); In re Estate of Kiger, 487 Pa. 143, 409 A.2d 5 (1979) (failure to object at time of
entry of decree constitutes waiver); Commonwealth v. Stein, 487 Pa. 1, 406 A.2d 1381 (1979)
(failure to raise procedural defect constitutes waiver); Doner v. Jowitt & Rodgers Co., 484
Pa. 496, 399 A.2d 402 (1979) (iisues not preserved when not raised in trial court); Broxie v.
Household Fin. Co., 472 Pa. 373, 372 A.2d 741 (1977) (failure to object to jury charge constitutes waiver); College Watercolor Group, Inc. v. Newbauer, 468 Pa. 103, 360 A.2d 200 (1976)
(objections to in-camera procedure not raised at trial are waived). See 493 Pa. at 376-77, 426
A.2d at 597.
136. 493 Pa. at 377, 426 A.2d at 597. Since other reasons supporting the motion for a
new trial were offered and not passed upon by the court en banc, the supreme court ordered
the case remanded for disposition of these remaining questions. Justice Roberts concurred
in the result. Id.
137. 231 Pa. Super. 455, 331 A.2d 555 (1974).
138. 240 Pa. Super. 578, 362 A.2d 314 (1976).
139. 231 Pa. Super. at 456, 331 A.2d at 555.
140. Id.
141. Id. The seller raised three arguments on appeal: that the issue of who breached
the contract was not a jury question but rather a question of law, that the incidental dam-
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had been properly preserved for appeal.14 The superior court followed Dilliplaine14 3 stating that basic and fundamental error is no
longer recognized as a ground for appellate consideration of matters not objected to at trial, declaring further that the seller was
now estopped from challenging the result.14
Similarly, in Williams, the court was forced to dismiss a clearly
valid claim on appeal because of the failure to raise objections at
trial or in the motion for new trial.145 In that case, Williams had
filed a trespass claim against Pepsi-Cola and had received a default
judgment in his favor. 146 Defendant thereupon filed an answer to
the complaint, and a board of arbiters awarded the plaintiff
$500.147 Williams appealed from this award amount to the lower
court, and the court found that the plaintiff's injuries were not
caused by defendant's negligence, and a verdict was entered
against Williams. 14 8 The plaintiff appealed from this decision,
claiming that the court erred in finding that he did not meet his
burden of proving defendant's negligence and, alternatively, that
the court should not have considered the issue of negligence at all
in this action upon a default judgment." 9 The superior court found
that although appellant was correct in his contention that the
lower court should have considered the amount of damages only
and not the issue of negligence, 150 it could not grant a new trial
ages were not pleaded, and that the showing of damages was not sufficiently certain. Id.
142. Id. at 456-57, 331 A.2d at 555. The court noted that seller's counsel had failed to
make any objections to these items at the time of trial, had failed to raise objection as to the
submission to the jury of possibly improper issues, had failed to submit to the court points
for charge, and had failed to take any exception to the charge. Id.
143. Id. at 457, 331 A.2d at 556. The Tronzo court also cited as support Commonwealth v. Reid, 458 Pa. 357, 326 A.2d 267 (1974); Commonwealth v. Williams, 458 Pa. 319,
326 A.2d 300 (1974); and Commonwealth v. Clair, 458 Pa. 418, 326 A.2d 272 (1974). 231 Pa.
Super. at 457, 331 A.2d at 555-56. See notes 78-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Dilliplaine.
144. 231 Pa. Super. 457, 331 A.2d at 556.
145. 240 Pa. Super. at 581, 362 A.2d at 316.
146. Id. at 580, 363 A.2d at 315.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 580-81, 362 A.2d at 315.
150. Id. at 581, 362 A.2d at 315. See PA. R. Civ. P. 1047(b), which provides that:
[A]fter a complaint has been filed and the time for pleading thereto has expired, the
prothonotary, on praecipe of the plaintiff, shall enter judgment against a defendant
who has neither pleaded to the complaint nor appeared at any time in the action. In
such cases, the damages . . . shall be assessed at a trial at which the issues shall be
limited to the amount of the damages.
PA. R. Civ. P. 1047(b). As to the lower court's finding that plaintiff failed to meet his burden
of proof, the superior court agreed. 240 Pa. Super. at 582, 362 A.2d at 316.
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since there was no proper preservation of issues at trial or in a
motion for and brief in support of a new trial.' Even with an error at trial so costly, easily comparable to the type of error that
earlier courts in the Commonwealth had found to be basic and
fundamental, the court in Williams would not reverse without
proper exception and preservation. ' 5'
As alluded to in Williams, the courts after Dilliplaine will not
hear an issue on appeal if it is considered to be abandoned in posttrial motion.1 53 In Carnicelli v. Bartram,1 5 this notion was clearly
adopted and further expanded. The appellant in the case brought
an action to recover fees for services rendered pursuant to certain
oral contracts. 5' 5 The appellee, in turn, counterclaimed for
amounts that had been loaned or advanced to the appellant. 5' 6 The
jury returned a verdict of $155,000 for appellant and $6,900 for
appellee.1 57 The appellee then motioned for and received an order
granting a new trial (the basis of the eventual appeal), the lower
court so granting on the grounds that the verdict was "contrary to
law" and "contrary to the evidence." 1 58 The court found the verdict contrary to law because the "probata" did not conform with
the complaint's "allegata." The court reasoned that the verdict was
contrary to the evidence because the theory at the time of trial was
151. 240 Pa. Super. at 581, 362 A.2d at 316. As explained by the court:
However correct ... (appellant's) legal position may be, we shall not disturb the trial
court's verdict where timely objection was not made, and the issue is now raised as
grounds for reversal. The recent discussion of Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co.
...lays to rest the "basic and fundamental error test" in all civil cases, holding that
failure to object or raise the matter below constitutes waiver for purposes of appeal.
Id. at 581-82, 362 A.2d at 316.
152. Id. at 581, 362 A.2d at 316. See discussion of general rule with regard to preservation of issues, supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
153. 240 Pa. Super. at 581, 362 A.2d at 316.
154. 289 Pa. Super. 424, 433 A.2d 878 (1981).
155. Id. at 428, 433 A.2d at 880.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. The superior court noted that an order granting or refusing a new trial, is
within the lower court's discretion, albeit a non-absolute discretion. Id. at 427, 433 A.2d. at
879. See generally Decker v. Kulesza, 369 Pa. 259, 85 A.2d 413 (1952); Albert v. Alter, 252
Pa. Super. 203, 381 A.2d 459 (1977). If the order granting a new trial is based on an error of
law or represents an abuse of discretion, the Carnicelli court explained further, then this
would be proper ground for reversal. 289 Pa. Super. at 427-28, 433 A.2d at 879-80. See
generally Handfinger v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 439 Pa. 130, 266 A.2d 769 (1970); Weaver
v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 267 Pa. Super. 548, 407 A.2d 45 (1979); Sindler v.
Goldman, 256 Pa. Super. 417, 389 A.2d 1192 (1978). The Carnicelli court also noted that in
reviewing the order, it was to examine all of the evidence presented at trial. 289 Pa. Super.
at 428, 433 A.2d at 880. See generally Hayter v. Sileo, 230 Pa. Super. 329, 326 A.2d 462
(1974).

1985

Basic and Fundamental Error

inconsistent with the theory of the complaint and because the verdict was in conflict with appellant's evidence. 5 9 In his motion for a
new trial, the appellee did not mention the inconsistent probata
and allegata; he included only such "boiler-plate" assignments as
the verdict was "against the evidence," "against the weight of the
evidence," and "against the law." 160 He did follow these allegations
with thirteen specific assignments of error, but the lower court discussed none of these in its opinion. 6 ' The issue, as the superior
court saw it, was whether the court could sua sponte consider unof error as though within the boiler-plate
made assignments
6 2
assignments.1
Considering the Getz line of cases,' 6 3 Dilliplaine,'""and the recent supreme court consideration of the impact of Dilliplaine on
these cases in Tagnani, 65 the superior court held that the general
"boiler-plate" assignments of error were insufficient to include specific assignments that could have been made but were not. 6 6 The
court maintained that this decision was necessarily implied in Dilliplaine and confirmed in Tagnani.'67 The superior court concluded that although it was an abuse of discretion for the lower
court to grant a new trial, the court could not order the lower court
to reinstate the verdict because that court had failed to discuss any
159. 289 Pa. Super. at 428, 433 A.2d at 880.
160. Id. at 428-29, 433 A.2d at 880.
161. Id. at 429, 433 A.2d at 880.
162. Id.
163. Id. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
164. 289 Pa. Super. at 429, 433 A.2d at 880. See supra notes 78-93 and accompanying
text (discussion of Dilliplaine).
165. 289 Pa. Super. at 429, 433 A.2d at 880. See supra notes 117-37 and accompanying
text.
166. 289 Pa. Super. at 430, 433 A.2d at 881. Applying the rules just stated, the court
remanded, stating:
We hold that it was abuse of discretion for the lower court to grant a new trial. The
court should have ignored appellee's general assignments of error, the verdict was
"against the law" and "against the evidence," and should have decided whether to
grant a new trial only on the basis of its opinion of the merits of appellee's specific
assignments.
Id. at 430-31, 433 A.2d at 881. The Carnicelli court noted that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has already said that this was true for criminal cases:
"Boilerplate" motions such as "the verdict was against the law" or "against the evidence," are not sufficient because "counsel's precise statement of issues and grounds
relied upon in written form [is necessary to] insure that both the trial court and the
Commonwealth will have adequate notice of the legal theories being advanced."
Id. at 430, 433 A.2d at 881 (quoting Commonwealth v. Waters, 477 Pa. 430, 434, 384 A.2d
234, 236 (1978)). See also Commonwealth v. Blair, 460 Pa. 31, 331 A.2d 213 (1975).
167. 289 Pa. Super. at 431, 433 A.2d at 881.
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of the specific assignments of error that were mentioned in the motion for new trial. 1 8 The superior court remanded the case with
instructions that were modeled, according to the court, on the current procedures of post-verdict motions in criminal cases, requiring
"that issues be preserved at each step of the review process so that
the process may be as orderly and efficient as possible."1 9
In 1978, in Schneider v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, Northern Division,1 70 the superior court further confirmed and carried to
an even stricter level its previously adopted stance on issue preservation. The plaintiff in this case initiated action in trespass against
the defendant (Medical Center), Dr. Murray Seitchik, Dr. Bernard
Goldstein and four others to recover damages for severe personal
injuries resulting from alleged negligence during certain preoperative procedures. 71 The jury, responding to special interrogatories, found for the plaintiffs in the amounts of $1,000,000. for
plaintiff Abraham M. Schneider and $500,000 for his wife.1 72 Posttrial motions for judgment n.o.v. and, alternatively, for a new trial
were filed by the Medical Center, Dr. Goldstein, and Dr. Seitchik.1 7' The motions were denied, and the defendants brought appeal
to the superior court.1 74 On appeal, the Medical Center raised
eleven issues, several containing a number of different allega168. Id. at 437, 433 A.2d at 884. According to the superior court, it could not tell from
the lower court's opinion whether these assignments were abandoned by appellee through
failure to brief and argue them to the court, or were considered by the court and found
meritless, or were not considered by the court since it had already decided to grant a new
trial based upon the boilerplate assignments. Id.
169. Id. The instructions by the superior court on remand were that if the lower court
considered the specific assignments meritless, it was to file an explanatory opinion and reinstate the verdict. If the lower court did not consider them, or had considered them favorably, the court was to consider only those motions argued in the brief in support of motion
for new trial, if such a brief had been submitted. If oral argument on the motion was held,
the court was to consider only the assignments briefed and either argued or specifically
reserved at argument. After consideration of properly preserved assignments, the lower
court was to then file an opinion explaining its conclusions, and either reinstate its order for
new trial or reinstate the verdict. Either party could then take a new appeal from the court's
order. Id. at 437-38, 433 A.2d at 884-85.
170. 257 Pa. Super. 348, 390 A.2d 1271 (1978).
171. Id. at 354, 390 A.2d at 1274.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. The superior court noted that in reviewing the court below on the refusal to
grant the requested motions, it must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
verdict winner, considering the evidence which supports the verdict and resolving all conflicts in testimony in favor of the appellee verdict winner. Id. at 354-55, 390 A.2d at 1274.
See Rutter v. Morris, 212 Pa. Super. 466, 243 A.2d 140 (1968).
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tions.17 5 The appellees successfully maintained that the Medical
Center had waived its appeal rights by, in effect, abandoning its
post-trial motions. 7 6 The Medical Center had filed timely posttrial motions after the verdict, but then took no further action: it
did not file a brief in support thereof and did not participate in
oral argument before the lower court on these motions. 17 7 The appellees filed a brief addressing the waiver issue, and the appellant
filed a reply brief on the matter. 7 8 Based upon all that had occurred, the superior court ruled that the Medical Center had
waived its right to appeal. 79 The failure to submit a brief in support of its motions, the superior court noted, was clearly in contravention of the local rule, s0 and the failure to so brief and argue the
motions, continued the court, operated to deprive the lower court
of "any meaningful opportunity to assess the merits of post-trial
motions," and the issues therein were therefore deemed waived on
appeal.' 8 1 The superior court cited the Dilliplaine opinion as
82
authority.1
Seitchik also raised numerous issues in his contention that he
was entitled to judgment n.o.v. or a new trial, one of which was
that the lower court erred when it charged the jury that proximate
cause could be established by evidence that defendant's conduct
increased the risk of injury. 8 3 The appellee contended that the
point was not included in appellant's post-trial motions, and the
superior court agreed. 84 The appellant's motion for new trial and
his brief in support thereof, the superior court noted, contained no
175. 257 Pa. Super. at 358, 390 A.2d at 1276.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 359, 390 A.2d at 1276.
179. Id. at 359, 390 A.2d at 1277.
180. Id. According to the superior court, the Common Pleas Court of Philadelphia
County had adopted Rule 240, also know as "Star Rule 256," 257 Pa. Super. at 359 n.2, 390
A.2d at 1277 n.2, establishing procedural rules for post-trial motions. Among other things
the rule provides:
(E) The Post-Trial Motion Clerk shall notify all counsel of the availability of the
transcribed notes. Counsel for the moving party shall file his brief with the Post-Trial
Motion Clerk within thirty (30) days of said notice, certifying the date he served
copies of his brief on all counsel of record . ...
Should the moving party fail to file his brief within the said thirty (30) days (unless
an extension is allowed by the Court), the motion shall be dismissed with prejudice.
257 Pa. Super. at 359, 390 A.2d at 1277 (emphasis supplied).
181. 257 Pa. Super. at 359-60, 390 A.2d at 1277.
182. Id. at 359, 390 A.2d at 1277.
183. Id. at 361, 390 A.2d at 1278.

184. Id.
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specific reference to this claimed error in the charge.' The court
felt that under such circumstances, the issue had to be considered
waived for appeal purposes. 8" Again the court cited Dilliplaine as
87
authority for the holding.
The court reached a similar conclusion in regard to Seitchik's
contention that certain expert testimony should have been stricken
below.188 In his brief to the court on appeal, Seitchik noted that on
this point he would adopt the argument set forth by the Medical
Center with regard to the testimony, pursuant to Rule 2137 of the
Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.'8 9 However, the Medical Center's brief contained no argument concerning such testimony.1 90 The court concluded that since Seitchik also had offered
no objection or motion to strike directed toward the testimony in
question at the time of trial, the challenge to the testimony had
been waived.' 9 '
Finally, the recent decision by the Allegheny County Court of
Common Pleas in Szold v. May Department Stores Co.' 92 indicates
that courts are still willing not only to adopt the thinking and
analysis of the Dilliplaine line of cases but to do so with a more
stringent application. Just as the Schneider court had held that
failure to submit a brief in support of post-trial motions resulted
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 361-62, 390 A.2d at 1278.
188. Id. at 362, 390 A.2d at 1278.
189. Id. Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2137 reads:
Rule 2137. Briefs in Cases Involving Multiple Appellants or Appellees.
In cases involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal pursuant to Rule 513 (Consolidation of Multiple
Appeals), any number of either may join in a single brief, and any appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another. Parties may similarly join
in reply briefs.
PA. R. App. P. 2137 (cited at 257 Pa. Super. at 362 n.3, 390 A.2d at 1278 n.3).
190. 257 Pa. Super. at 362, 390 A.2d at 1278.
191. Id. Other contentions raised by Dr. Seitchik and dismissed by the superior court
were: (a) There was insufficient evidence to establish that any of his own conduct was the
proximate cause of Mrs. Schneider's injury; (b) There was insufficient evidence to support a
finding that he was liable, on an agency theory, for acts of negligence by the anesthesiologists; (c) He should have been granted a new trial because: (1) the lower court failed to
properly charge the jury that the element of control was an essential ingredient to the imposition of liability under the "captain of the ship" doctrine; (2) the lower court erred in failing to clarify the proper elements of damages which plaintiff could recover; and (3) the
lower court erred when it permitted plaintiff to introduce evidence of a six percent inflationary factor for Mrs. Schneider's medical care needs for the remainder of her life. Id. at 36063, 390 A.2d at 1277-79.
192. 132 P.L.J. 104 (Allegh. Co. 1984).
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in waiver of the right to appeal on the issues raised therein, 193 the
Szold court held that an inadequate brief also waived the right to
appeal. 194 The court held that the brief must contain at least the
matter required by the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. 19 This was seen not as the imposition of a new or additional
burden on counsel or parties, but as the codification of what had
been traditionally, historically, and legally required of such briefs,
with additions reflected by developing law. 96 After a detailed analysis of the issues raised by the appellant' 97 and the contents of the
brief in support thereof, the Szold court concluded that the brief
and the arguments contained therein were "wholly inadequate to
admit of meaningful review." The appeal rights were thus waived
and the motion for a new trial was denied. 99
The uncertainties presented by the doctrine of basic and fundamental error were in Dilliplaine erased from the Commonwealth
jurisprudential system. Although a Pennsylvania attorney now
cannot hope for a declaration of basic and fundamental error
should his opponent prevail at trial, the certainty as to what is now
expected of him by the courts should facilitate full trial and
post-trial preparation, such that there will be no need for such a
declaration: if the lawyer is diligent, all errors will have been raised
and preserved and pointedly offered to the trial court for
adjudication.
V.

CONCLUSION

Whether one wholly favors the strict preservation of issues approach of Dilliplaine and its progeny as a vital means of enhancing
the quality and the efficiency of the dispute resolution process, or
193. See supra notes 170-91 and accompanying text (discussion of Schneider).
194. 132 P.L.J. at 107. The Szold court, in addition to Dilliplaine, cited as authority
for this holding A. M. Skier Agency v. Pocono Futures, Inc., 308 Pa. Super. 481, 454 A.2d
637 (1982), in which the superior court quashed an appeal because the inadequate brief did
not give the court a basis for meaningful appellate review. Id. at 482, 454 A.2d at 637. The
Skier court noted that the brief contained no development of the contentions of appellant,
had no citation of any authority, and, where the summary of the argument contained twelve
lines, the actual argument was less then fourteen. Id.
195. 132 P.L.J. at 107. Particularly, the brief must contain at least those matters set
forth in PA. R. App. P. 2111, except (a)(1), (8); 2112; 2113, (a) only; 2116, (a) only; 2117
(a)(1), (4), (5)(c)(1), (2), (3), (4); 2119 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e); and 2132. 132 P.L.J. at 107.
196. 132 P.L.J. at 107.
197. The appellant here, who was found liable in the jury's answer to a submitted
interrogatory and motioned for a new trial, was May Department Stores Co. 132 P.L.J. at
104.
198. Id. at 111.
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adamantly opposes it as a possible violation of the rights of innocent litigants represented by careless or incompetent attorneys,
one thing is clear: a much more stringent level of counsel preparedness is being required by appellate courts in the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania today. After the supreme court decision in Tagnani,
the superior court opinions in Tronzo, Schneider, Williams and
Carnicelli,and even the common pleas opinion in Szold, an attorney practicing in this Commonwealth not only must raise before
the jury recesses any errors that he feels have been committed during the course of the trial or in the instructions to the jury, but
must also preserve all of these issues by raising and arguing them
in post-trial motions for new trial or judgment n.o.v., 1"" if appropriate, and in any briefs in support of these motions. If any specific
instructions to the jury are desired, they must have been submitted in his points for charge or be deemed waived. When appeal is
taken, his appellant or appellee brief must, again, keep all of the
issues alive by arguing them. In short, attorneys must be constantly conscious of all the issues at all stages of pre-trial, trial,
and post-trial procedures.
Of course, before Dilliplaine the general rule that only properly
preserved issues would be considered on appeal was still in effect.
As discussed, however, the doctrine of basic and fundamental error
also co-existed during this period, so that if an attorney did not
fully comply with the dictates of the general rule his client might
still be afforded the opportunity for appellate review if the error
was viewed as being a grave one. Once Dilliplaineswept away this
doctrine, the courts began to toughen the requirements for proper
issue preservation until the standard developed into the almost inflexibly strict one it is today. Currently if an attorney does not
199. Effective January 1, 1984, all post-trial motions were consolidated into Pa. R.C.P.
227.1, reproduced in part below:
(a) After trial and upon the written Motion for Post-Trial Relief filed by any party,
the court may
(1) order a new trial as to all or any of the issues; or (2) direct the entry of
judgment in favor of any party; or (3) remove a nonsuit; or (4) affirm, modify
or change the decision or decree nisi; or (5) enter any other appropriate order.
(b) Post-Trial relief may not be granted unless the grounds therefor,
(1) if then available, were raised in pre-trial proceedings or by motion, objection, point for charge, request for findings of fact or conclusions of law, offer of
proof or other appropriate method at trial; and (2) are specified in the motion.
The motion shall state how the grounds were asserted in pre-trial proceedings
or at trial. Grounds not specified are deemed waived unless leave is granted
upon cause shown to specify additional grounds.
PA. R.C.P. No. 227.1.
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comply to the fullest extent possible with the requirement to properly preserve issues, any right to hear these issues on appeal is
deemed fully and finally waived.20 0
This change can be viewed in two ways by an attorney, only one
of which will lead to an enhancement of the profession. An attorney can consider the effect of this legal swing as an obstacle which
makes it impossible to practice the trade, a trap for the less than
perfectly meticulous. However, a better view for all concerned-for
the court system, the client, and the attorney himself-is to consider the dictates of issue preservation as a challenge to all in the
legal profession to fully and absolutely provide the best representation possible. If approached in this way, the long range results
will surely be an overall increase in the quality of advocacy. An
attorney will have to concentrate so strenuously on a case that no
detail will be overlooked or issue left unraised, such that no need
for the basic and fundamental error escape will arise.
Of course, until this latter view is fully adopted, it is the illrepresented client who must suffer. As Justice Manderino in his
concurrence in Dilliplaine maintained, a client can in a malpractice suit attack his attorney for inadequate representation, 20 1 but
how often a client will actually pursue this route is speculative. If
the involved claim is unsuccessful, the client will have to bear all
attorneys' costs for the bringing of the action, and, regardless of
the final outcome, will suffer the expense incurred as the result of
lost working hours and the mental and emotional drain from the
continued litigation. It seems a fair observation that many parties
whose attorneys make a fatal error will probably take their losses
and choose not to pursue action against their attorney. If indeed,
as Justice Pomeroy noted, the doctrine of basic and fundamental
error is intended to protect litigants and not incompetent attorneys,20 2 perhaps the new legal philosophy will be injurious to the
client after all.
Still, the infrequent use of the doctrine of basic and fundamental error in the past, coupled with the new awareness that attorneys undoubtedly will have with respect to issue preservation, suggest that the hardship faced by clients will be slight. Also, as the
majority in Dilliplaine noted, through Justice Roberts, it really is
not fair for one attorney to fully and competently handle a case
200.
201.
202.

See supra notes 117-98 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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only to have a favorable outcome overturned and a new trial initiated because an ill-prepared adversary can invoke the doctrine of
basic and fundamental error.2 03 Even if Justice Burger's observations with respect to attorney competence are correct,2 0' the fact
that basic and fundamental error was so little employed in the past
would cause one to think that its abrogation would do little harm.
It was a prudent and timely move for the Dilliplaine court to
remove the doctrine of basic and fundamental error from our jurisprudential system and replace it with a system of strict issue preservation. The harm that might be occasioned by this move will be
more than compensated for by the increased ability and attentiveness that attorneys will eventually attain, and a client that is victimized by a basic and fundamental error that is not preserved
does have other, though certainly less attractive, routes for seeing
that his rights are not violated or infringed. Particularly so if the
dictates of this line of case law is stressed in law school and in
pre-attorney employment and experience, the doctrine of basic and
fundamental error will become not the seemingly violated notion
that it is today, but rather just a legal relic from an age where
attorney training was accomplished by individual reading in front
of an oil lamp. With strict requirements existing in legal education
today, the potential for full preparation of lawyers in this new approach to issue preservation will soon obviate any need for the doctrine of basic and fundamental error.
Dale K. Forsythe

203. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the equities
involved.
204. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.

